From 0fdb02fb9e5f1706e44d4875eb838560c6f87c93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: levonpetrosyan93 Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 03:24:35 +0400 Subject: [PATCH] Extra payload size limit increased --- src/validation.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp index 656d640b4e..cbc8b6b258 100644 --- a/src/validation.cpp +++ b/src/validation.cpp @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction &tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe // Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability) if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize"); - if (tx.vExtraPayload.size() > MAX_TX_EXTRA_PAYLOAD) + if ((tx.vExtraPayload.size() > MAX_TX_EXTRA_PAYLOAD && nHeight < ::Params().GetConsensus().stage4StartBlock) || tx.vExtraPayload.size() > NEW_MAX_TX_EXTRA_PAYLOAD) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-payload-oversize"); // Check for negative or overflow output values